Securities regulation and implicit penalties  by Chen, Donghua et al.
China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 47–62Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
China Journal of Accounting Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c jarSecurities regulation and implicit penaltiesq
Donghua Chen a, Yuyan Guan b, Gang Zhao a,c,⇑, Feifei Wu a
a Institute of Accounting and Finance, Nanjing University, China
bDepartment of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong, China
cDepartment of Accountancy, Changzhou University, Chinaa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 12 October 2009
Accepted 11 October 2010







Underwriter1755-3091/$ - see front matter  2011 China Jour
Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights re
doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2011.04.004
q This paper is supported by the National Social S
70602011). We also appreciate support from the IA
Finance and Economics, Research Project 985 of the I
winter seminar at City University of Hong Kong. We
Yuetang Wang, Xinhe Li, Donghui Wu, Xing Xiao, Xi
comments and advice. We thank the anonymous re
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Institute of Acc
E-mail address: zhaogang0517@126.com (G. Zhaa b s t r a c t
The extant literature offers extensive support for the signiﬁcant role played by institutions in
ﬁnancialmarkets, but implicit regulation andmonitoringhaveyet to beexamined. This study
ﬁlls this void in the literature by employing unique Chinese datasets to explore the implicit
regulation and penalties imposed by the Chinese government in regulating the initial public
offering (IPO) market. Of particular interest are the economic consequences of underwriting
IPO deals for client ﬁrms that violate regulatory rules in China’s capital market. We provide
evidence to show that the associated underwriters’ reputations are impaired and their mar-
ket share declines. We further explore whether such negative consequences result from a
market disciplinarymechanismor apenalty imposedby the government. To analyze thepos-
sibility of amarket disciplinarymechanismatwork,we investigate (1) themarket reaction to
other client ﬁrmswhose IPO dealswere underwritten by underwriters associatedwith a vio-
lation at the time the violation was publicly disclosed and (2) the under-pricing of IPO deals
undertaken by these underwriters after such disclosure. To analyzewhether the government
imposes an implicit penalty, we examine the application processing time for future IPO deals
underwrittenby the associatedunderwriters andﬁnd it to be signiﬁcantly longer than for IPO
deals underwritten by other underwriters. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the
market penalizes underwriters for the rule-violating behavior of their client ﬁrms in China.
Instead, the Chinese government implicitly penalizes them by imposing more stringent cri-
teria on and lengthening the processing time of the IPO deals they subsequently underwrite.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Becker (1968), Stigler (1970) and Posner (1974) point out that if the law is complete, conﬂicts can be resolved by the
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48 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 47–62the law is incomplete. The scope for government regulation of the economy has thus gradually expanded. Aoki et al. (1997)
argued that regulation can be considered the result of the legal system’s endogenous evolution. However, it remains unclear
whether regulatory agencies play only an explicit role. The extant research suggests that these agencies may also inﬂuence
the operation of the economy in an implicit manner (Chen et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2009). In this study, we examine the im-
pact of the implicit power of regulatory agencies on the behavior of underwriters in the initial public offering (IPO) process in
China. North and Thomas (1973) pointed out the importance of studying implicit rules, or so-called informal constraints.
This is of particular importance in transition economies such as China, where an understanding of only formal or explicit
rules is insufﬁcient. China is currently undergoing a transition from a planned to a market economy and from a traditional
to a modern society. In such a rapidly transforming society, government regulation may be an important substitute mech-
anism for the law (Chen et al., 2008). China’s current system of government regulation plays a role in maintaining market
order, protecting the interests of consumers and society at large, and promoting industrial development (Yu, 1994).
Securities markets play an important role in market economies. Research on the regulatory behavior of governments and
the consequences of that behavior can have important practical implications. China’s securities market opened about 20
years ago and its capacity has recently undergone rapid expansion, both in the number of listed companies and the amount
of ﬁnancing. The expansion of this market has occurred so rapidly that a number of poor-quality companies have been al-
lowed to enter the market, a situation that can be attributed to the country’s securities issuance system. Since inception,
stock issuances underwritten by securities ﬁrms require approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
However, as the information between investors and issuers in the IPO process is severely asymmetric, a trustworthy third-
party is required to ensure the normal operation of the IPO process. Issuers rely on this third party to convey information to
investors and to prove that their stocks are fairly priced. Underwriters undertake this task as an intermediary agent of quality
certiﬁcation and information production (Huang, 2005).
Underwriters are expected to exercise due diligence in the listing selection process, to convey truthful information about
issuers to the capital market and to facilitate the overall development of the capital market. In reality, however, they may not
fulﬁll these expectations. The incomplete law and weak law enforcement that are prevalent in transition economies poten-
tially provide strong incentives for misbehavior. To serve short-term interests, some underwriters recommend to the capital
market companies that exhibit poor performance. Some listed ﬁrms are found to have engaged in severe violations of the law
soon after an IPO, thus disturbing the normal operations of the market. The CSRC has formulated laws and regulations
accordingly. However, these laws and regulations often lag behind the rapidly developing and ever-changing capital market.
In many circumstances, reliance on existing laws and regulations undoubtedly provides inefﬁcient or even ineffective super-
vision. In addition, standard enforcement mechanisms are often unable to function effectively in the early stages of market
development, meaning these types of problems in transition economies cannot be resolved simply by the courts or through
law enforcement or regulation. Mechanisms beyond law enforcement are needed to avoid supervisory and control failure.
For example, an implicit contract may be a necessary complement to an explicit contract. To discourage irresponsible behav-
ior on the part of underwriters, it may be more effective for securities regulatory authorities to supplement explicit mech-
anisms with implicit punitive measures. For example, if a violation occurs shortly after an IPO, then the CSRC may assess the
joint liability of the underwriters involved and may scrutinize other companies recommended by these underwriters more
closely or apply stricter criteria to them. This ‘‘soft knife of strict control’’ may have a signiﬁcantly negative impact on these
underwriters’ market share.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of listed companies’ violations on the underwriters who were associated with
their IPOs. We show that the market share of these underwriters decreases signiﬁcantly, even though the market response
to the disclosure of rule-violating behavior is insigniﬁcant. We further ﬁnd that the approval time for subsequent IPO appli-
cations recommended by underwriters associated with violations is signiﬁcantly longer than that for other applications.
Hence, we conclude that the decline in market share experienced by underwriters associated with violations can be attrib-
uted primarily to implicit government regulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 discusses the insti-
tutional background, theoretical analysis and research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample and data sources, and pro-
vides descriptive statistics. Sections 5–7 provide the empirical analysis and our test results. Section 8 concludes the paper.2. Literature review
China’s securities underwriting system has a short history of only 20 years and the research on it to date has focused
mainly on the role played by underwriters. Few studies have examined the government’s regulatory role in the IPO process.
We review the relevant literature in two major areas: (1) government regulation and implicit contracts and (2) underwriter
reputation.2.1. Government regulation and implicit contracts
Many scholars have investigated the role of government regulation in both analytical and empirical settings. In Keynes’
(1936) summary of the economic theories that have prevailed since Adam Smith ﬁrst proposed his ‘‘invisible hand’’ theory,
which Keynes challenges, he advocates state policy intervention in the economy to achieve full employment and economic
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a rational government should intervene in the economy. Stigler (1971) proposes regulatory capture theory, which posits that
industry actively seeks government regulation whose design and implementation are primarily targeted at allowing it to en-
joy greater beneﬁts. Posner (1974) argues that the laissez-faire market approach is particularly vulnerable and inefﬁcient,
thus providing a public interest theory to underpin the necessity of government regulation.
More recent studies provide support for these theories. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), for example, demonstrate that since
the 19th century, government regulation has provided an effective response to the challenges of a changing economic envi-
ronment when legal mechanisms are not guaranteed to be impartial. Shleifer (2005) proposes ‘‘enforcement theory,’’ arguing
that government regulation is a trade-off between the costs of social disorder and dictatorship. Government regulation has
many advantages in controlling disorder effectively. Government agencies could be more ready and effective, than courts, to
monitor violations of the law. Pistor and Xu (2002) also call for securities market regulation on the basis of ‘‘the imperfection
of the law.’’
China’s economic transition has adopted an exogenous institutional change model, i.e., it constitutes government-led re-
form based on the government’s understanding of a dynamic market economy. The institutional arrangements made during
this transition, and their resulting policy effects, may deviate from the objectives of government policy. Hence, Zhu and Ling
(2005) posit that the Chinese government should implement appropriate controls to promote a smooth market transition.
Zhang (2007) ﬁnds the Chinese stock market in the transitional period to operate imperfectly, which could lead to serious
market failures. As the market has been unable to reach Pareto efﬁciency, effective government supervision has become a
necessity. However, government intervention can be costly. To expand their authority and supervisory capacity, government
agencies require administrative approval at different stages of economic transactions. It is also possible for these agencies to
exchange their rights for direct or indirect economic beneﬁts. The CSRC is the main authority empowered to regulate China’s
securities market. Chen et al. (2003) document two important roles played by the CSRC: (1) supervision of listing ﬁrms and
ensuring the normal operation of the capital market and (2) evaluation of ﬁrms’ eligibility to enter that market.
Explicit contracting refers to government regulation through laws and regulations. Another form of regulation, namely,
implicit contracting, is also common. Baily (1974), Gordon (1974) and Azariadis (1975) proposed implicit contract theory
after investigating the relationship between employers and employees. They show that risk-averse employees reach unspo-
ken, long-term insurance contracts with risk-neutral companies to avoid income uncertainty. Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983),
Chari (1983) and Hart (1983) introduced the incomplete and asymmetric information assumption to implicit contract theory
to render it more realistic and explanatory. In the years since, a variety of research ﬁelds have adopted implicit contract the-
ory. For example, it has been employed to examine ‘‘customer relationship-type’’ bank lending (Sharpe, 1990) and the rela-
tionship between executive pay and future performance (Hayes and Schaefer, 2000).
Academic research on implicit contracts in China is limited and focused primarily on macro-market issues. Zhang et al.
(2001), for example, integrate Krugman’s (1991) intervention theory of the exchange market into a theory of implied war-
ranties on state-owned enterprises. They propose a model of implicit government guarantee contracts in the securities mar-
ket and conclude that such guarantees are determined by their objective function in the stock market. They further argue
that the attainment of this objective function relies on the relatively smooth development of the securities market. In addi-
tion to intervention through the imposition of market regulations, the government can also take administrative measures to
control the size and spread of the stock market, thereby intervening in the market index. Zhang (2005) also demonstrate
that, in the governance of state-owned commercial banks, the government’s goal is the realization of political interests. It
works with stakeholders through a collection of ‘‘signed’’ implicit contracts. The government also subsidizes the inefﬁcient
operations of these banks in pursuit of public functions. Zhou (2006) ﬁnds that the government must assure investors of a
certain rate of return on their investment in the early stages of stock market development through an implicit commitment.
Chen et al. (2008) suggest that the power of government regulation may have a spill-over effect in economies with an under-
developed legal system. This spillover of regulatory power rests not only upon explicit contracts (such as government reg-
ulations and ordinances), but also works via consensus, albeit implicit, expectations of the rationale involved. Such
consensus expectations, or an ‘‘invisible handshake,’’ constitute an implicit contract.2.2. Underwriter reputation
Regulations are general rules or special actions developed and implemented by an executive agency to intervene directly
in the market allocation mechanism or to change supply and demand decisions indirectly. They thus constitute a ‘‘discipline
mechanism’’ (Spulber, 1999). There is also an important self-regulatory mechanism that constrains the behavior of economic
entities, namely, a reputation mechanism.
Booth and Smith (1986) investigate the importance of underwriters’ reputation capital and argue that corporations em-
ploy underwriters during IPOs to mitigate information asymmetry between themselves and investors in the IPO process.
Underwriters both produce and deliver value in ensuring that an IPO price reﬂects the intrinsic value of the ﬁrm through
authentication and information transfer. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) ﬁnd that high-quality enterprises take the initia-
tive to hire highly reputed underwriters in an attempt to avoid adverse selection, differentiate themselves from low-quality
issuers and obtain a high issuing price. Carter et al. (1998) test this ﬁnding empirically and document a positive correlation
between the reputation of US underwriters and the quality of the ﬁrms whose IPOs they oversee.
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punishment can take the form of being ‘‘crowded out’’ of the market, but sometimes also requires government intervention.
Beatty et al. (1998) and Song and Uzun (2003) show that regulatory action by the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) against violations committed by underwriters or their IPO clients has a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the former’s
reputation capital. Huang and Shi (2006) construct a two-stage game model under an asymmetric information structure, and
conclude that regulators’ tolerance of underwriting violations leads to a tarnished reputation for both the regulators and the
underwriters involved.
Several studies have examined the reputation mechanism in China’s securities market. Xu and Wei (2007), for example,
examines the operation of the reputation mechanism of China’s investment banks by investigating ex-post IPO under-pric-
ing, the market share growth of these banks and the quality of their IPO client ﬁrms, among other factors. Other researchers
have claimed that the reputation mechanism does not play a signiﬁcant role in China’s securities market. For instance, Huang
(2005) shows that CSRC investigations of underwriters produce minimal information and have an insufﬁcient punitive effect
on underwriters’ reputations. Liu et al. (2005) employs business volume as a proxy for underwriters’ reputation and empir-
ically analyzes the relationship between such reputation and IPO client ﬁrm quality. He concludes that this relationship is
distorted in China and that the information production and authentication functions of the country’s underwriters are
ineffective.3. Institutional background, theoretical analysis and hypotheses
3.1. Institutional background
China’s securities market was established and has developed during the nation’s transformation from a planned to a mar-
ket economy. A fully functioning stock issuance and listing system is one of the most important mechanisms in ensuring the
healthy development of a securities market. China’s stock issuance system has undergone the four following major stages.
(1) January 1993 to December 1999: administrative allocation system stage
The most important feature of this initial stage was the administrative allocation of the IPO quota, in which both the
central and local governments were involved. Permission to go public was not determined by a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial con-
dition, but by its relationship with the central and local government. Lead underwriters had no power to choose client
ﬁrms and their major strategy was securing issuance amounts and distribution.
(2) January 2000 to March 2001: transition stage of approval system
In terms of the issuance system, this stage differed little from its predecessor. Its main task was digesting the latter’s
quota. However, there were a number of signiﬁcant changes in the rules of scrutiny and in the listing process.
(3) March 2001 to December 2003: channel and approval system stage
In the third stage, each underwriter was allotted a certain number of channels. Each listing ﬁrmwas recommended via
one channel and channels could be reused.
(4) February 2004 to present: sponsor and approval system stage.
The implementation of the sponsor system, under which underwriters bear legal responsibility for their decisions, was
a major breakthrough in China’s IPO system.
In this ongoing stage, the CSRC and the Securities Association of China have released more than a dozen regulations con-
cerning underwriters, some of which directly assess their quality. These include ‘‘Trial Measures of Underwriter Credibility
Assessment’’ (in effect since March 16, 2000), ‘‘Reputation Scoring Rules of Lead Underwriters’’ and ‘‘Interim Measures of
Practice Quality Assessment for Lead Underwriters’’ (both effective from September 13, 2002 to December 31, 2004), ‘‘Inter-
im Measures of Sponsor System on Securities Issuance and Listing’’ (effective from February 1, 2004 to December 1, 2008),
and ‘‘Management Measures of Sponsor Business for Securities Issuing and Listing’’ (effective from December 1, 2008 to pres-
ent). Underwriter reputation assessment formerly took place through the election of 10 outstanding underwriters each year
mainly through rating the credibility of individual lead underwriters and the receipt of a poor score was punished through a
cut in the number of channels available to the underwriter. Since implementation of the sponsor system, however, sponsor-
ing underwriters have been held jointly liable for any violations committed by their client ﬁrms within two years of an IPO or
within one year of a seasoned equity offering (SEO).
Although the government has formulated a number of regulatory laws, they remain incomplete in the country’s complex
and volatile economic environment. Such incompleteness is a result of both the imperfect legal system itself and the insuf-
ﬁcient punishment of violations. The law thus provides little deterrent effect and its ability to maintain social and economic
order is weak. China is well known for the prevalence of Confucianism, a tradition that restrains undesirable behavior
through moral standards (or ‘‘hidden rules’’) rather than laws. Such hidden rules can compensate for the lack of laws, par-
ticularly in a dynamic economic environment. In addition, the high enforcement costs of laws challenge the effectiveness of
legal systems. There are many issues involved in the assessment rules governing the behavior of underwriters. For example,
the ‘‘Trial Measures of Underwriter Credibility Assessment’’ reward underwriters who receive a good rating, but impose few
penalties on those who exhibit poor performance.
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tion channels open to the country’s 83 underwriters remained continuously free. According to statistics,1 from July to August
2004, there were more than 150 free channels; between September and December of the same year, the suspension period for
IPOs, there were more than 140 free channels, accounting for 45% of the total number available. It is thus clear that penalizing
underwriters via a cut in their number of recommendation channels had a very weak punitive effect. Moreover, although the
underwriters of IPOs or SEOs have had joint legal liability for the violations of their client ﬁrms since the end of 2004, no under-
writers have been explicitly punished for such violations. Our aim in this study is thus to investigate how government regula-
tors in China ensure that underwriters conscientiously and effectively follow the rules to provide underwriting services in a way
that protects the interests of investors. More speciﬁcally, we explore whether there are efﬁcient hidden rules that restrain
underwriter misbehavior.3.2. Theoretical analysis and hypotheses
In the past three decades of China’s reform process, mandatory institutional changes have provided the engine of change.
The government has played a more important role than the market in the economic system and institutional transition.2
Although the fundamental objective of China’s economic transition has been to transform the resource allocation mechanism
from a government-planned to a market-based system, government inﬂuence has remained signiﬁcant throughout the process.
The government has also had an important impact on resource allocation in the securities market, as reﬂected by the ‘‘quota
management’’ instigated under the approval system. The country’s Securities Act of 1999 introduced the approval system,
thereby abolishing quota management in stock issuance, but its establishment did not mean the market became completely
free. The government retains the power to determine offering eligibility. In the process of assessing applications for public offer-
ings, the CSRC not only evaluates issuers’ eligibility and the authenticity of the materials submitted, but also judges’ applications
on the basis of a series of speciﬁc requirements and standards for such offerings.3 The regulator also retains the right to veto
public offering applications.
The regulator’s role is to maintain the stability and development of the securities market. Scandals inevitably harm such
stability and development, damage the reputation of the regulatory authorities and possibly affect the careers of the prin-
cipal ofﬁcials involved (Chen et al., 2008). Therefore, securities regulatory authorities impose penalties on rule-violating
behavior and pursue the joint prosecution of all parties involved, including the client ﬁrms, underwriters and audit ﬁrms.
As a result, the underwriters associated with rule-violating ﬁrms have a record with the securities regulators. We conjecture
that the regulatory authorities step up their monitoring of underwriters with a bad record. When reviewing the public offer-
ing applications recommended by these underwriters, for example, they will scrutinize them more closely, thereby delaying
the offering process and generating greater uncertainty. As a result, we expect the market share of underwriters with a bad
record with the authorities to decline.
In addition to government inﬂuence, underwriters’ market share is also subject to market forces. Given the large degree of
information asymmetry between issuers and investors, the former’s choice of underwriter serves as an important signaling
mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry and ex-ante uncertainty. Based on this reputation mechanism, companies
tend to choose underwriters with a good reputation to send a positive signal to the market, gain greater credibility and rec-
ognition from the market, and raise more funds. The prior literature shows that IPO under-pricing is signiﬁcantly lower
among IPOs underwritten by reputable underwriters (e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986). If a violation comes to light shortly after
a listing, thus indicating the poor quality of the underwriting services, then the public will lose conﬁdence in the underwriter
involved, damaging its reputation. Thus, if the reputation mechanism is effective, we would expect a potential client ﬁrm to
be reluctant to choose an underwriter that is associated with a rule violation, thereby leading to a decrease in that under-
writer’s market share. The foregoing discussion leads us to our ﬁrst hypothesis, as follows.
H1: If a listed company’s violation of the rules comes to light shortly after an IPO, then the market share of the afﬁliated
underwriters will decline.
Empirical research has provided rich evidence in support of the importance of the reputation mechanism to underwriters.
It has been shown, for example, that high-quality businesses tend to select reputable underwriters and that reputable under-
writers choose high-quality clients (Booth and Smith, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Carter et al., 1998). However,
the data for most of these studies come from developed capital markets. It is well known that although China’s securities
market has grown rapidly, it remains far from developed. Prior to 2000, the country’s underwriting market was completely
controlled by the government. Between 2001 and 2004, the underwriting system developed into a channel system, which
gave the market greater inﬂuence. During this government- to market-driven transition period, China’s stock market was
chaotic. In 2005, the CSRC thus suspended IPO approvals for one year to consolidate underwriters and listed companies.1 ChongQing Times, 2005-1-5, http://cqsb.hsw.cn/gb/cqsb/2005-01/05/content_1546822.htm.
2 Lin (1994) pointed out that institutional change can be divided into two types: induced change and mandatory change. Mandatory institutional change is a
system command substitution introduced by government mandate and law and is, in essence, state intervention.
3 Such standards cover issuers’ ﬁnancial condition and management structure, the investment value and risk involved, and the legality of and compliance
with relevant intermediary activities.
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may not necessarily work effectively in China’s securities market. In support of this supposition, Xu (2008) found no signif-
icant relationship between Chinese IPO under-pricing and underwriter reputation in a study of broker rankings using com-
prehensive business volume as a proxy for reputation. He argues that underwriter reputation communicates no valid
information to the market in China. Zhang (2001) analyzes the issue from the angle of government control and argues that
the lack of a reputation mechanism in China’s securities market is due primarily to excessive control by the regulatory
authority. He claims that such excessive control increases the uncertainty of the stock market, leads to monopolies, rent-
seeking and corrupt practices, and distorts market expectations, thus inducing opportunistic behavior.4 Liu et al. (2005) sum-
marizes the reasons for the distorted relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO quality in China: (1) the lack of a
mechanism to restrain IPO ﬁrms from telling lies; (2) the lack of an incentive mechanism to establish a reputation for telling
the truth; and (3) the lack of a monitoring and punishment mechanism aimed at underwriters who assist in ﬁrms’ fraudulent
behavior. Based on the foregoing analysis, we argue that an underwriter reputation mechanism is absent in China and posit our
second hypothesis, as follows.
H2. There is no market reaction to ﬁrms underwritten by underwriters whose other clients have violated the IPO rules.
Securities market regulation in China takes a centralized administrative approach. The country’s Securities Act provides
the core legal framework for the uniﬁed supervision of this market, and the CSRC plays the centralized supervisory role. Self-
regulatory mechanisms play only a minor and supplementary role in assisting the monitoring and supervision of the CSRC.5
If all of the listed companies recommended by an underwriter prove to be ‘‘well-behaved,’’ then that underwriter will make a
good impression on the CSRC. We thus expect the CSRC to give greater credence to the IPO recommendations of such under-
writers and, accordingly, are more likely to approve them. If, in contrast, the listed companies previously recommended by
an underwriter were poor performers that violated the rules soon after an IPO, then the CSRC is likely to scrutinize the subse-
quent IPOs recommended by these underwriters and subject them to stricter criteria in an attempt to penalize such irrespon-
sible behavior.6 Consequently, the approval process for the IPO applications recommended by violation-afﬁliated underwriters
may be longer. Although there are no formal rules stipulating the speciﬁc penalties to be imposed on underwriters afﬁliated
with rule violations, such a ‘‘soft knife’’ approach could potentially have a pronounced negative impact on an underwriter’s mar-
ket share and thus play an effective disciplinary role.
To a certain extent, these kinds of hidden or implicit rules could serve to supplement formal or explicit rules. Further, the
inadequacy of the latter renders the former more important. As laws and institutions improve, some implicit rules may grad-
ually turn into explicit rules, whereas others may remain implicit for the following reasons. First, no matter whether explicit
or implicit in nature, rules are generated in response to a particular issue and are generally stable over time. Second, the
implementation costs for certain implicit rules to become explicit can be high. For example, the formulation of speciﬁc cri-
teria to measure the effects of such rules is difﬁcult in practice. Collecting evidence according to explicit rules is also costly,
making them difﬁcult to enforce. Finally, once certain implicit rules become explicit, individuals with vested interests lose
the right to appropriate or allocate resources and thus suffer losses. Such individuals are often those making the rules, mak-
ing them very reluctant to transform implicit rules into explicit rules.
All of these reasons apply to securities regulation in China, and thus, regardless of the explicit rules that apply, the CSRC
may impose implicit penalties on the underwriters of IPO ﬁrms that violate the rules. More speciﬁcally, we expect that dur-
ing the IPO approval process, the CSRC may be stricter with companies underwritten by underwriters whose previous clients
violated the rules, either by applying more stringent approval criteria or by extending the approval time. Accordingly, our
third hypothesis is as follows.
H3. The approval time for IPOs underwritten by an underwriter with implied responsibility for a previous rule violation is
longer than that for IPOs underwritten by other underwriters.4. Data and descriptive statistics
4.1. Data and samples
Most of the data used in this study was obtained from the WIND database, including the Securities Exchange data, listed
company data, non-compliance data, underwriter data and IPO data. We also hand-collected data from the CSRC website, the
Securities Association of China website and the websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Our main sample4 Zhang (2001) proposed a simple game model with four basic conditions to analyze the reputation mechanism: (1) the transaction must be repeated; (2) the
information must be passed sufﬁciently quickly, otherwise the cost to maintain a good reputation would increase; (3) trader dishonesty must be punished to
repay the costs; and (4) the dealer must have the expectation that the transaction is in his or her long-term interests, which corresponds to the ﬁrst condition.
5 Since 1997, China’s two stock exchanges have been directly supervised by the CSRC. Item 167 of the Securities Act stipulates the eight security regulation
duties of the State Council, but does not mention the role of self-regulation.
6 According to the approval system, the regulatory authority should not only punish issuers upon discovery of fraudulent behavior, but should also audit IPO




Total number of listed companies with violations 50 444
Excluding:
Number with more than three years between IPO year and violation year 22 411
Number of repeatsa 6 6
Remaining sample 22 27
Largeb 7 11
Non-large 15 16
a The number of repeats refers to listed companies underwritten by the same underwriters. We focus on the most serious cases and regard the rest as
repeat cases.
b Large refers to large-scale underwriters. Based on the ranking of underwriters released by the Securities Association of China, those ranked in the top 20
for at least three consecutive years are considered to be large.
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maximum time span from listing year to violation year is six years in our sample. The longer the time span, the less likely it is
that the corresponding underwriter will be held jointly liable for the violation. Hence, we restrict the sample to violations
within a three-year time span (the median). We further divide the sample into two groups according to the size of the under-
writers (Large and non-large).
Using December 31, 2000 as a cut-off point for our pre- and post-2001 subsamples, we identify 22 and 27 rule-violating
ﬁrms, respectively, as shown in Table 1. We divide the sample in this way because, prior to 2001, China’s underwriting sys-
tem was based on administrative allocation, with the market playing a very limited role in the process. Underwriting busi-
nesses were mainly subject to government administration in the ﬁrst years of our sample, thus providing us with a relativelyTable 2
Distribution of violations.
Typea 1997–2000 2001–2007
Large Non-large Large Non-large
Panel A: Distribution by penalty type
Internal criticism 1 1
Public condemnation 2 8 9
Public criticism 4 7 3 1
Public penalty 3 5 1 4
Total 22 27
Panel B: Distribution by violation time span
IPO year 1 2 3
1 year after IPO year 3 5 3 1
2 years after IPO year 2 3 3 7
3 years after IPO year 2 6 3 5
Total 22 27










Panel C: Distribution of violation types from 1997 to 2000
Failure to provide accurate and timely forecast of performance 6 27.27 6
Failure to disclose important events on time 2 9.09 1 1
Failure to disclose important events on time and carry out duties in compliance with the
law
2 9.09 1 1
Failure to carry out duties in compliance with the law 3 13.64 3
Disclosure of false information or a misleading statement 8 36.36 3 1 4
Going public fraudulently 1 4.55 1
Total 22 100.00 50% 22.7% 27.3%
Panel D: Distribution of violation types from 2001 to 2007
Failure to provide accurate and timely forecast of performance 3 11.11 3
Failure to disclose important events on time 12 44.44 3 1 3 5
Failure to disclose important events on time and carry out duties in compliance with the
law
2 7.41 1 1
Failure to carry out duties in compliance with the law 2 7.41 2
Disclosure of false information or a misleading statement 8 29.63 1 2 3 2
Total 27 100.00 18.5% 22.2% 29.6% 29.6%
a There are ﬁve penalty categories. From least to most severe, they are internal criticism, public condemnation, public criticism, public penalty and
criminal responsibility.
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and 2007, the country’s underwriting system evolved into an approval and sponsor system, in which the market began to
play a role, and the government quota allocation system was abolished. Under the latter system, IPO applications were rec-
ommended by a lead underwriter and voted on by an approval committee, with ﬁnal approval granted by the CSRC. The
2001–2007 subsample thus permits examination of the combined government-market effect on underwriters.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. As shown in Panel A, 11 cases were classiﬁed as ‘‘public criticism’’ cases in
the 1997–2001 period, accounting for 50% of the sample, and eight (36% of the sample) were classiﬁed as ‘‘public penalty.’’
After 2001, four and ﬁve cases were classiﬁed as public criticism and public penalty, respectively, accounting for 14% and 18%
of the sample. Cases subject to public condemnation accounted for 62.9% of the total sample. As can be seen from the table,
the severity of punishment for violations by listed companies seems to have declined since 2001, which may suggest that an
increasing number of ﬁrms are complying with the rules. It is also clear that fewer companies with violations were under-
written by large underwriters than small underwriters, thus suggesting that the quality of the former is higher than that of
the latter. According to the time distribution of violations presented in Panel B of Table 2, violations before 2001 were most
frequent one year or three years after the IPO, whereas those after 2001 were most frequent two years after the IPO. The
statistics for the large and non-large subsamples show the time gap between violations and IPOs to be more evenly distrib-
uted for the former.
Panels C and D of Table 2 present the distribution of violation types for the 1997–2000 and 2001–2007 periods, respec-
tively. The major observations can be summarized as follows.
(1) There are six and three cases that failed to provide accurate or timely performance forecasts during the 1997–2000
and 2001–2007 periods, respectively. All occurred within one year of the IPO year. As forecast data comes from the
IPO ﬁnancial reports, the underwriters involved are directly related to the violations.
(2) Two and 12 cases failed to disclose important events on time in the two respective periods. Of the 12 cases in the
2001–2007 period, three violations occurred in the IPO year and four more violations in the two-year period following
the IPO.
(3) There were two cases of failure to disclose important events in a timely fashion and two cases of non-compliance in
the two subsample periods. Half of these occurred within the two-year period following the IPO.
(4) There were eight cases of ﬁrms disclosing false or misleading information in each sub-period, which are deemed to be
serious violations. These ﬁrms are characterized by poor ﬁnancial performance and low-quality information disclo-
sure, and their underwriters can be considered to have failed to exercise due diligence and are jointly liable for the
violations.
As can be seen from the table, according to the rules stipulated by the sponsor system, the underwriters should have been
held responsible for the majority of violations, as most occurred within two years of the IPO. In addition, since the liability of
underwriters who underwrite companies in the growth enterprise market has been extended to three years after the IPO
year, we include in our sample all ﬁrms committing a violation within this three-year period.
4.3. Variable deﬁnitions
The variables used in this paper are deﬁned in Table 3.5. Do listed ﬁrm violations lead to a decline in their underwriters’ market share?
5.1. Market share and ranking
We examine underwriters’ change in market share within three years of a violation in the 1997–2000 and 2001–2007
periods, as calculated by their market share in the current year minus that in the previous year. Market share is measured
on the basis of (1) the number of IPO deals underwritten by an underwriter in a given year divided by the total number of IPO
deals that year and (2) an underwriter’s amount of IPO ﬁnancing divided by the total amount of IPO ﬁnancing that year.7 To
avoid the systemic effects of an increase in the total number of underwriters over time, we employ the market share of under-
writers without violations as a benchmark to infer whether violations lead to a decrease in the market share of underwriters
associated with them. We further investigate the change in underwriters’ rankings in each period, which is less subject to
the market share dilution effect. Basically, we rank the underwriters in descending order according to their market share in7 Market share is calculated on the basis of underwriting business. If an underwriter underwrote no IPO business, then its market share is calculated as 0. The
market share of underwriters that ﬁled for bankruptcy is also calculated as 0 for the year after bankruptcy was ﬁled. The main calculations in the case of
reorganization, mergers and restructuring are based on the new post-merger market share. For example, if Shanghai Shenyin SWS Securities and Shanghai




Markt IPO market share in year t. It is calculated as the amount of IPO funds raised by the underwriter divided by the total IPO funds in year t
Markt1 IPO market share in previous year, i.e., t  1. It is calculated in the same way as Markt
Punish Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if any of the underwriter’s IPO client ﬁrms had a previous violation, and 0 otherwise
Lnsize Natural logarithm of the underwriter’s underwriting revenue
Iﬂist Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the underwriter is a listed ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise
Region Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the underwriter is registered in the East region, and 0 otherwise
UPR_day IPO under-pricing on the ﬁrst day. It is calculated as follows
UPR = (P1–P0)/P0-mreturn, where P1 is the closing price on the ﬁrst day, and P0 is the issue price
UPR_week IPO under-pricing in the ﬁrst week. It is calculated as above, with P1 the closing price at the end of the ﬁrst week
UPR_month IPO under-pricing in the ﬁrst month. It is calculated as above, with P1 the closing price at the end of the ﬁrst month
Lnpro Natural logarithm of the issuing price multiplied by the issuing number
Rsd Standard error of the return in the month after the IPO
Lots Lot winning rate
State Dummy variable that equals 1 if the company is state-owned, and 0 otherwise
Lnasset Natural logarithm of the company’s total assets
Lagdate Number of days from issuing date to listing date
Lev Leverage of the company, calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets
Age Number of years from establishment year to IPO year
Roe Return on equity, calculated as net income divided by equity
Hu Dummy variable that equals 1 if the company is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise
Applytime Length of time from shareholder decision to prospectus issuance
Punish_after Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the company is underwritten after a violation, and 0 otherwise
Large Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the total amount of underwriting funds is ranked in the top 20 from 2004 to 2008, and 0 otherwise
Growth Growth in ﬁrm revenues before IPO year
Year Year dummy variables
Industry Industry dummy variables
Table 4
Market share and ranking.
Variable N Median Z Pr > |Z| Mean T Pr > |t|
Panel A: Comparison of market share during 1997–2000
Number diff
a
22 0.011 0.883 0.337 0.017*** 3.57 0.002
Funds diff 22 0.015 1.253 0.247 0.012** 2.42 0.025
Panel B: Comparison of market share during 2001–2007
Number diff 27 0.003 1.303 0.193 0.012* 2.00 0.056
Funds diff 27 0.005* 1.881 0.060 0.015** 2.50 0.019
Panel C: Comparison of ranking during 2001–2007
Ranking Changeb 27 3.000* 1.73 0.087 2.756* 1.88 0.070
A diff = adjusted market share in later year minus adjusted market share in current year.
b Change = market rank in later year minus market rank in current year; t statistics are shown in the parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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change in ranking, in contrast, indicates increased market share.
The results of our analysis of the change in market share and ranking are tabulated in Table 4. It can be seen in Panels A
and B that both the mean and median changes in the number of deals and amount of IPO funding for underwriters associated
with violations are negative, thus suggesting that their market share, on average, declined signiﬁcantly after the violations
occurred. These results are robust across the two subsample periods. As previously noted, in the 1997–2000 period, govern-
ment regulation was the sole factor in the IPO approval process, with the market effect playing an insigniﬁcant role. We thus
infer that the decline in underwriters’ market share during this period was the result of government regulation. In the 2001–
2007 period, IPOs were subject to the approval and sponsor system, in which both the government and the market played a
role. The decline in underwriters’ market share during this period may thus be the result of both government regulation and
market selection. Panel C shows that the rankings of underwriters associated with violations declined in the year following
those violations. Both the mean and median are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Overall, these test results show that following violations, the market share of the underwriters associated with them de-
clined signiﬁcantly. However, further analysis is needed to distinguish the effects of government regulation from those of
market selection.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of the variables.
Variable N Mean Min Median Max sd
Markt 384 0.021 0.000 0.005 0.466 0.047
Markt1 384 0.019 0.000 0.005 0.466 0.044
Punish 384 0.068 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.252
Lnsize 384 18.268 13.268 18.242 21.475 1.292
Iﬂist 384 0.128 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.334
Region 384 0.763 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.426
Table 6
Pearson correlation coefﬁcient of each variable.
Variable Markt Mark t1 Punish Lnsize Iﬂist Region
Markt 1.000
Markt1 0.526*** (0.000) 1.000
Punish 0.055 (0.286) 0.038 (0.457) 1.000
lnsize 0.459*** (0.000) 0.489*** (0.000) 0.158*** (0.002) 1.000
Iﬂist 0.100** (0.049) 0.089* (0.079) 0.010 (0.847) 0.151*** (0.003) 1.000
Region 0.175*** (0.001) 0.174*** (0.001) 0.077 (0.132) 0.207*** (0.000) 0.099* (0.053) 1.000
t Statistics are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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In this section, we report the results of multivariate analysis of the impact of violations on the market share of the under-
writers associated with them. If the IPO client ﬁrm of an underwriter violates the rules, then the underwriter’s reputation
will be damaged. We additionally expect its market share to be adversely affected. Multivariate analysis allows us to account
for other factors that may affect an underwriters’ market share, such as market share in the previous year, size, listing status,
registration location and year. We run the regression based on the following equation (model I).Markett ¼ b0 þ b1Markt1 þ b2Punishþ b3Lnsizeþ b4Iflistþ b5Regionþ Yeardummiesþ e ð1Þ
An underwriter’s market share is calculated on the basis of both its amount of IPO funding and number of IPO deals, as
previously discussed. We use the fund index to calculate an underwriter’s market share in our analysis of the impact of listed
companies’ violations on that market share, and we then use the number of IPO deals to calculate market share as a robust-
ness test. We also control for underwriter size in this model and, in general, expect a positive correlation between size and
market share. As underwriters are ﬁnancial ﬁrms, their size is not measured by total or net assets, but rather by the total
revenue from their underwriting business. The underwriter’s listing status (Iﬂist) is also included in the regression, as we
expect listed underwriters to enjoy a better reputation and greater market visibility; thus, listing status is expected to affect
market share. In addition, we also control for the location in which the underwriters are registered. China’s eastern region is
considered to have a better legal environment and more developed economy, and thus more companies going public. Under-
writers located in this region may therefore enjoy a ‘‘local advantage’’ and, accordingly, a larger market share.
5.3. Empirical results
5.3.1. Descriptive statistics
Wemake certain adjustments according to mergers, reorganizations and name changes among underwriters in the 2001–
2007 period and obtain a total of 499 underwriter-year observations. After excluding observations with missing data, we
retain 384 for our regression analysis. Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our regression.
It is clear that the majority of the underwriters are not listed and most are registered in the eastern region.
The Pearson correlation coefﬁcients of the variables are presented in Table 6, from which it can be seen that underwriters’
market share is signiﬁcantly correlated with their market share in the previous year. The market share in year t is negatively
correlated with ‘‘Punish,’’ but not at a statistically signiﬁcant level. As expected, market share is positively correlated with
underwriters’ size, listing status and registration in the eastern region.
5.3.2. Regression results
We run the multivariate regression and the results for the testing of model I are presented in Table 7.
As shown in Table 7, the estimated coefﬁcient on Punish is negative and signiﬁcant (p < 0.01), thus supporting our
hypothesis that an underwriter’s market share will decrease signiﬁcantly in the next period if its IPO client ﬁrms commit
Table 7
Regression results.
(1) Markt (amount of IPO funding) (2) Markt (number of IPO deals)
Markt1 0.401*** (7.71) 0.175*** (3.33)
Punish 0.022*** (2.68) 0.008* (1.74)
Lnsize 0.011*** (5.82) 0.008*** (7.42)
Iﬂist 0.002 (0.40) 0.004 (1.31)
Region 0.006 (1.21) 0.005* (1.91)
Yeardummies Yes Yes
Intercept 0.170*** (5.25) 0.114*** (6.31)
N 384 384
Adj. R2 0.338 0.307
t Statistics are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
*** p < 0.01.
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signiﬁcant (p < 0.01). The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on Lnsize suggests that the larger the underwriter, the greater
its market share. The coefﬁcient on Region is also positive and signiﬁcant, thus indicating that underwriters in the eastern
region enjoy a local advantage. Lastly, the coefﬁcient on Iﬂist is positive, but insigniﬁcant.
In summary, the analysis in this section provides supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1, which posits that an under-
writer’s market share will decline signiﬁcantly after one of its client ﬁrms commit a violation.
6. Market response to client ﬁrm violations
Our analysis shows that if a listed company violates the rules shortly after an IPO, then its afﬁliated underwriter experi-
ences a signiﬁcant drop in market share. However, as previously discussed, it remains unclear whether this decline is the
result of government regulation/penalties or market selection. In this section, we thus investigate the market response to
the discovery of violations by the client ﬁrms of an underwriter. We analyze two aspects of this response: (1) the under-pric-
ing of the IPOs underwritten by afﬁliated underwriters and (2) the stock market response to other listed ﬁrms underwritten
by these underwriters upon discovery of violations.
6.1. IPO under-pricing following violations by listed companies
The IPO under-pricing phenomenon has been widely documented since the 1960s. It refers to an IPO price being set lower
than the market price in the secondary market, with its stock price rising substantially in the ﬁrst day of public trading. Prior
research shows such under-pricing to be negatively correlated with underwriter reputation (e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986;
Carter and Manaster, 1990). Therefore, by examining the under-pricing of the new IPOs underwritten by a given underwriter,
we can determine whether a client ﬁrm’s violation impairs the reputation of the underwriter associated with that violation.
If there is greater under-pricing of new IPOs among underwriters associated with violations, then this would suggest that the
decline in underwriters’ market share can be partially attributed to market selection as a result of the reputation mechanism.
If, in contrast, we ﬁnd no such greater under-pricing among these underwriters, then we can infer that the main factor in that
decline is government penalties/regulation.
6.1.1. Model
Based on the foregoing discussion, we employ the regression speciﬁed in model II below to test the relationship between
underwriter violations and the under-pricing of new IPOs. Our main test variable is Punish, a positive and signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcient on which would suggest that an underwriter’s reputation is tarnished by a client ﬁrm violation and that the market
penalizes it by demanding greater under-pricing. As IPO under-pricing is also affected by many other factors, such as new
share issuance size, stock price uncertainty and the lot winning rate (Lots), we follow Chen et al. (2004) and Xu (2008) in
including a number of control variables in the following model.UPR ¼ b0 þ b1Punishþ b2Lnproþ b3Rsdþ b4Lotsþ b5Stateþ b6Lnassetþ b7Lagdateþ b8Levþ b9Ageþ b10ROE
þ b11Huþ Yeardummiesþ Industrydummiesþ e ð2ÞWe employ three measures for under-pricing (UPR), namely, ﬁrst-day, ﬁrst-week and ﬁrst-month under-pricing, as it
sometimes takes longer than one day for the market to price an IPO efﬁciently. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that IPO size
is related to business-related speculation. The smaller the offering size, the greater the degree of such speculation. A large
offering size is normally seen for large companies, which are usually subject to more stringent supervision by the govern-
ment and regulatory agencies, as well as more monitoring by large investment groups. Therefore, information asymmetry
is relatively small for these ﬁrms, and the degree of under-pricing should be lower. Hence, we control for the offering size
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standard deviation of returns after the IPO to measure IPO uncertainty. We expect it to be positively correlated with under-
pricing.
Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) argue that under-pricing may be due to information leakage during the IPO process. We
thus include ‘‘Lots’’ in our model. The lower its value, the higher the degree of under-pricing is expected to be. In addition, we
control for other ﬁrm characteristics, including size, leverage, age, ROE, listing on the Shanghai Exchange, and year and
industry ﬁxed effects.
6.1.2. Sample and descriptive statistics
In this analysis, we focus on new IPOs underwritten within one year of a violation announcement by the underwriters
involved. Of the 28 listed companies with violations included in this analysis, we identify the corresponding IPOs underwrit-
ten by the same underwriters within one year of the violation notice and obtain a total of 77 IPOs. We assign a 1 to the Punish
variable for these IPOs. We further identify another 445 IPOs in the WIND database, and assign a 0 to the Punish variable for
them. As a result, we have a total of 522 IPOs underwritten by the two types of underwriters in the same period.
Table 8 presents the distribution of IPOs for the two types of underwriters over time and the mean under-pricing in each
year during the 2001–2007 period.
As shown in Panel B of Table 8, the mean UPR for the ﬁrst day, week and month for IPOs underwritten by underwriters
associated with violations is greater than that for IPOs underwritten by other underwriters in the overall sample. Among the
three under-pricing measures, UPR_day is greatest, followed by UPR_week and UPR_month. We suspect that the market
overvalues IPOs on the ﬁrst day, thereby driving up the price, which gradually returns to a rational level thereafter. In addi-
tion, the pattern of IPO under-pricing over time is consistent with the overall performance of the Chinese stock market. We
ﬁnd no consistent pattern when comparing the IPO under-pricing for ﬁrms underwritten by the two types of underwriters in
each year: that of those underwritten by underwriters associated with violations is higher in certain years (2001, 2002, 2003
and 2004) and lower in others (2005, 2006 and 2007).
6.1.3. Regression results
We present our regression results in Table 9, from which it can be seen that the coefﬁcient on the main variable is neg-
ative, but insigniﬁcant. The results are consistent across the three under-pricing measures and those for the other control
variables are consistent with the prior literature: IPO offering size is negatively correlated with under-pricing, that is, there
is less under-pricing among large companies. The coefﬁcient on Rsd is signiﬁcantly positive, which is consistent with greater
IPO under-pricing for stocks characterized by greater uncertainty. We also see a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on Lots.
All of the results are robust to the different measures of under-pricing.
The foregoing tests and analysis demonstrate that the market’s response to a decline in an underwriter’s reputation is not
signiﬁcant.
6.2. Market response to the announcement of violations
In this section, we investigate whether the market responds to the announcement of violations. If the violations of a client
ﬁrm have a negative impact on the reputation of the underwriters involved, then the market should also display concern
over the quality of other listed companies underwritten by those underwriters (Beatty et al., 1998), which we expect to
be exhibited in a decline in the market value of these listed ﬁrms. Accordingly, we examine the three-, ﬁve- andTable 8
IPO Distribution and annual under-pricing.
Typea 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Panel A: IPO distribution for two types of underwriters
1 3 15 5 7 2 12 33 77
0 76 56 62 93 13 53 92 445
Total 79 71 67 100 15 65 125 522
Under-pricing Type All sample (%) Mean of annual under-pricing
2001 (%) 2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 2006 (%) 2007 (%)
Panel B: Under-pricing for two types of underwriters
UPR_day 1 145.08 106.25 125.31 60.86 80.48 24.62 98.77 208.21
0 126.70 195.79 152.32 72.93 69.36 48.28 81.65 185.28
UPR_week 1 134.44 101.31 117.05 68.29 58.96 45.73 85.34 194.63
0 122.84 191.56 150.80 71.14 63.64 42.25 82.84 178.15
UPR_month 1 131.28 74.48 117.08 68.85 53.60 61.87 84.79 189.96
0 120.42 190.71 147.58 66.61 54.01 41.11 87.04 179.67
a ‘‘1’’ represents an underwriter associated with a violation, i.e., an underwriters whose client had a violation in the previous year; ‘‘0’’ indicates an
underwriter with no associated violation.
Table 9
Regression results for model II.
(1) (2) (3)
UPR_day UPR_week UPR_month
Punish 0.006 (0.04) 0.079 (0.57) 0.090 (0.57)
Lnpro 1.519*** (8.80) 1.470*** (8.80) 1.682*** (8.90)
Rsd 8.689 (1.60) 9.450* (1.80) 9.259 (1.56)
Lots 0.573*** (8.85) 0.511*** (8.15) 0.609*** (8.59)
State 0.054 (0.56) 0.061 (0.65) 0.069 (0.65)
Lnasset 0.974*** (6.98) 0.936*** (6.93) 1.143*** (7.47)
Lagdate 0.013*** (6.60) 0.012*** (5.90) 0.015*** (6.69)
Lev 2.032*** (4.84) 1.968*** (4.85) 2.416*** (5.26)
Age 0.020 (1.07) 0.020 (1.13) 0.023 (1.13)
Roe 0.003 (0.28) 0.003 (0.33) 0.002 (0.17)
Hu 0.482*** (2.90) 0.503*** (3.12) 0.506*** (2.78)
Yeardummies Yes Yes Yes
Industrydummies Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 12.72*** (8.72) 12.40*** (8.78) 12.60*** (7.89)
N 425 425 425
Adj. R2 0.800 0.798 0.760
t Statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
*** p < 0.01.
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surrounding the violation announcement.
We employ buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to measure the market reaction. We calculate the three-day [1, 1],






* p < 0.






ð1þ RmtÞ;where Rit is the return of stock i on day t, t = 1, 2, . . . , 7, and Rmt is the value-weighted rate of return of all A-shares on day t,
considering re-investment of cash dividends.
Because the shorter the time gap between the listing day and the violation day, the more likely it is that the underwriter
shares joint liability for the violation, we divide violations into four categories based on the time gap: violations that occur in
the IPO year and those that occur one, two and three years after it. Table 10 provides the means and t-tests of the CARs.
If an underwriter’s reputation is tarnished by the announcement of a violation by one of its client ﬁrms, then we would
expect the market value of the other listed companies it has underwritten to decline. Accordingly, we would expect negative
CARs during the event window. However, as shown in Table 10, there is little evidence of negative CARs for the other listed
companies underwritten by an underwriter associated with a violation. The mean CARs [1,1] are signiﬁcantly negative for
violations occurring within one year and three years of an IPO. Those for all other event windows and other categories are a
mix of positive and negative numbers, but all are insigniﬁcant. We can thus conclude that when the client ﬁrm of an0
tive abnormal returns during event window.
Variable Mean T Pr > |t|
1] Violation in IPO year 0.001 0.53 0.599
Violation in ﬁrst year after IPO 0.005** 2.29 0.023
Violation in second year after IPO 0.001 0.46 0.649
Violation in third year after IPO 0.004* 1.94 0.053
2] Violation in IPO year 0.004 1.14 0.255
Violation in ﬁrst year after IPO 0.003 0.95 0.346
Violation in second year after IPO 0.002 0.53 0.594
Violation in third year after IPO 0.009 1.62 0.108
3] Violation in IPO year 0.004 0.79 0.431
Violation in ﬁrst year after IPO 0.001 0.30 0.765
Violation in second year after IPO 0.003 0.56 0.575
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ten by the same underwriter.
Combined with our empirical evidence of IPO under-pricing, these results suggest that the decline in market share for
underwriters involved with violations is the result of neither the reputation mechanism nor the market effect, but is more
likely to be due to government penalties/regulation.7. Are there hidden rules in securities regulation?
To some extent, government regulation provides an alternative to the legal system. Although the CSRC is the main gov-
ernment authority tasked with supervising the securities market and maintaining its stability and development, it has no
authority to bypass the legal process, to assess the direct loss to investors of a scandal or to order those responsible to pro-
vide compensation (Chen et al., 2008). We conjecture that the CSRC instead takes an implicit approach to fulﬁlling its duties.
IPO allocation is the result of a process involving companies, the CSRC, the government at different levels and underwriters.
The CSRCmay also adopt subtle methods to regulate the approval process, so as to achieve its objectives. To discipline under-
writers in a way that ensures they fulﬁll their responsibilities as ﬁnancial intermediaries and reduce the occurrence of vio-
lations, the CSRC can exercise pressure or impose implicit penalties on those involved in violations. We conjecture that the
CSRC may do so by lengthening the approval process or imposing stricter criteria on the IPO applications underwritten by
underwriters associated with previous violations.
To test these conjectures empirically, we collect the approval times for IPOs between 2001 and 2008. Going public is a
complex process. First, agreement to a fund-raising program must be reached in a general meeting of shareholders, after
which an underwriter provides counsel on the company’s IPO application. The underwriter and the company then submit
the application to the CSRC and wait for its approval. Approved IPO ﬁrms publish a prospectus notice within one to two
months of approval, and are then listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In calculating approval times, we were
unable to obtain the exact date on which listed companies submitted their applications to the CSRC, and we thus used the
date disclosed in the prospectus as the date on which the IPO plan was approved by shareholders as a proxy. Our assumption
was that after the plan had been approved, the company would have immediately begun listing preparation. As we could
obtain only the approval times published by the CSRC from 2004 to 2008, we adopted the prospectus signing date as the
approval date.
We divided underwriters into two categories: those that underwrote listed companies that committed violations within
three years of an IPO and all other underwriters. The underwriters of 58 IPOs fall into the ﬁrst category and those of 124 into
the second. Fig. 1 presents a comparison of the IPO approval times for the two types of underwriters for each year. With the
exception of 2005, it can be seen that the approval time for companies underwritten by underwriters associated with vio-
lations was longer than that for those underwritten by underwriters without violations. The discrepancy in 2005 may be
because IPO approvals were effectively put on hold in 2005, and there were a large number outstanding from the previous
year. To process them quickly, the CSRC may have temporarily stopped distinguishing between underwriters on the basis of
violations. The aforementioned difference between the two types of underwriters increased signiﬁcantly in 2007 and 2008.
However, the time trend shows approval times becoming shorter over time, thus indicating a marked improvement in the
efﬁciency of the approval process.
We also compare the mean and median IPO approval times for the two categories of underwriters for the overall sample.
Both are longer for the IPOs underwritten by underwriters associated with violations, and the differences are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level (see Table 11, Panel A). We also compare the approval times for IPOs underwritten by viola-
tion-associated underwriters before and after those violations were committed, and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between
both the mean and the median (see Table 11, Panel B). Overall, there is evidence to suggest that the IPO application process-
ing time is longer for IPOs underwritten by underwriters associated with violations.Fig. 1. Comparison of approval time.
Table 11
Comparison of approval time.
N Mean T Pr > |t| Median Z Pr > |z|
Panel A: Comparison of approval times for two categories of underwriters
Approval time without violation 124 310 3.33 0.0013 296 3.071 0.002
Approval time with violation 58 377 377
Panel B: Comparison of approval times before and after violations
Approval time before violation 44 308 2.63 0.010 288.5 2.625 0.010
Approval time after violation 58 377 377
Table 12
Impact on approval times.
(1) Applytime (2) Applytime (3) Applytime
Punish_after 54.120*** (2.80) 78.580*** (3.42) 76.080*** (3.23)
Large 35.690** (2.01) 29.720 (1.60)
State 21.950 (1.16) 21.230 (1.10)




Yeardummies Yes Yes Yes
Industrydummies Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 269.30*** (9.80) 199.90 (1.22) 287.40 (1.58)
N 182 150 150
Adj. R2 0.364 0.374 0.369
t Statistics are in parentheses.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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model III:Applytime ¼ b0 þ b1Punish afterþ b2Largeþ b3Stateþ b4Lnassetþ b5Roeþ b6Levþ b7Growth
þ Yeardummiesþ Industrydummiesþ e ð3ÞIn this multivariate regression, approval time (Applytime) is the dependent variable. It is measured as the time gap be-
tween approval at the shareholder meeting and the signing date of the prospectus. We also control for underwriter size as a
measure of underwriter ability. We expect a shorter approval time for IPOs underwritten by large underwriters. We further
control for a number of ﬁrm characteristics, including size, proﬁtability, ﬁnancial leverage and growth. Finally, we distin-
guish between companies underwritten by underwriters associated with violations from other companies by the Pun-
ish_after variable, and adopt the difference-in-difference method to run the regression for the 2002–2008 period. The
results are tabulated in Table 12.
From these regression results, we can see that there is a positive coefﬁcient on Punish_after, which suggests that the ap-
proval time for IPOs underwritten by underwriters associated with violations is longer than that for other IPOs. This result is
robust to controls for underwriter size and ﬁrm characteristics. Consistent with our prediction, the large the underwriter, the
shorter the approval time.
The average approval time for the IPOs of companies underwritten by underwriters associated with violations is about 70
days longer than that for other ﬁrms. This longer approval time potentially serves as an implicit penalty to underwriters in-
volved with violations and may adversely affect their market share. Firms that are anxious to go public may turn to under-
writers without violations to avoid any possible delays. We thus conclude that the Chinese government imposes an implicit
penalty on underwriters associated with violations and this penalty plays an important disciplinary role.8. Conclusion
This study investigates the impact of client ﬁrm violations on the market share of underwriters involved in the client
ﬁrm’s IPO. We show that client ﬁrm violations can lead to a decline in market share for associated underwriters. To deter-
mine whether this decline is due to government regulation/penalties or to market selection, we further analyze the under-
pricing of IPOs underwritten by underwriters associated with a violation and the market reaction of other listed ﬁrms under-
written by the same underwriter upon discovery of the violations. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact in either situation. We thus
conclude that the decline in underwriters’ market share is most likely due to implicit government regulation. The CSRC may
62 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 47–62not punish underwriters associated with violations of its rules in a formal and direct way. Instead, it employs a number of
‘‘hidden’’ regulatory instruments to penalize them, such as the imposition of stricter criteria during the approval process and
extending the time required for approval. The market mechanism in transition economies is usually incomplete and inefﬁ-
cient, and government regulations thus play an important role. By imposing implicit penalties on underwriters, the CSRC can
convey supervision information to the market, thereby encouraging underwriters to provide due diligence, improving the
quality of listed companies and promoting the healthy development of the securities market.
One limitation of this study must be acknowledged. Our sample size is relatively small, which may potentially bias our
results. They should thus be interpreted with caution.
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